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CHERRY STILL ON TOP: HOW PINKERTON 
CONCEPTS CONTINUE TO GOVERN CO-
CONSPIRATOR FORFEITURE OF 
CONFRONTATION RIGHTS POST-GILES 
Abstract: To combat the ever-expanding problem of witness intimidation, courts 
have employed familiar concepts of conspiracy liability to justify the extension 
of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in the context of group criminality. Un-
der what is known as the Cherry doctrine, one co-conspirator’s misconduct in 
making a witness unavailable can generally be imputed to another co-conspirator 
defendant to forfeit the latter’s Confrontation Clause rights. In 2008, in Giles v. 
California, the U.S. Supreme Court added a wrinkle to this forfeiture analysis 
that seemingly put the Cherry doctrine in jeopardy. By inserting a new element 
of intent, the Giles decision potentially limited forfeiture to situations in which a 
defendant personally possessed the intent to make a witness unavailable. Despite 
what some commenters have suggested, however, the Cherry doctrine survives 
the Giles Court’s shift in emphasis. Even though Giles now requires the intent to 
make a witness unavailable, the scope of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine 
remains unchanged in the co-conspirator context. So long as one co-conspirator 
possesses the intent to make a witness unavailable, this intent can be imputed to 
the defendant, thus allowing the Cherry doctrine to live on. 
INTRODUCTION 
The K Street Crew sold large quantities of marijuana across the greater 
Washington, D.C. area for two decades, protecting their trade with an astonish-
ing amount of violence.1 When the FBI finally found an informant, Robert 
“Buchie” Smith, who was willing to testify against this impenetrable criminal 
enterprise, the gang’s enforcer tracked down this witness-to-be and murdered 
him in cold blood.2 Before Smith was murdered, however, he made various 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Christopher Newton, Urban Gangs in the United States Use Technology to Silence Witnesses, 
STREETGANGS.COM, Mar. 28, 2001, http://www.streetgangs.com/news/032801-urban-gangs, archived 
at http://perma.cc/8CQE-9CSW. The K Street Crew was notorious for witness intimidation, reported-
ly murdering seven witnesses-to-be from 1993 to 1996. D.C. Hit Man Convicted in 9 Murders, 
DESERET NEWS, Aug. 16, 2001, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/858772/DC-hit-man-convicted-
in-9-murders.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3R7B-LHJG. 
 2 United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336, 339–40 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Smith was prepared to testify 
about the gang’s several attempted and completed murders, as well as the details of the gang’s crimi-
nal enterprise. Id. at 360. 
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statements to the FBI that incriminated gang members and detailed the Crew’s 
criminal operations.3 
During the trial of Samuel Carson—the so-called enforcer of the gang al-
leged to have murdered Smith—the government introduced prior statements 
that the deceased informant made to the FBI.4 Despite Carson’s claim that the 
introduction of these statements violated his constitutional right to face his ac-
cuser, the district court concluded that the defendant forfeited his right to con-
front this witness by way of his wrongdoing (murdering the informant) and, 
therefore, admitted the testimony.5 This decision was hardly controversial, as 
the longstanding doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing dictated the result.6 
What was controversial, however, was the court’s decision to allow Smith’s 
statements to be used against other K Street gang members as well—members 
that did not participate in Smith’s murder.7 In 2006, in United States v. Carson, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s de-
cision and held that Carson not only forfeited his own right to face his accuser, 
but his misconduct also forfeited the Confrontation Clause rights of his fellow 
K Street Crew co-conspirators.8 Accordingly, the convictions of all of the K 
Street Crew members were upheld.9 
The D.C. Circuit’s holding in this case is representative of the trend 
among modern-day courts: when faced with witness intimidation in the context 
of group criminality, courts have relied on familiar concepts of conspiracy lia-
bility to define the limits of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine.10 In 2000, 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Id. at 340, 370. 
 4 Id. at 360. Carson was tried in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for numerous 
crimes, including narcotics conspiracy, racketeering conspiracy, and murder. Id. at 347. Of particular 
importance for this Confrontation Clause analysis, Carson was charged for the murder of the inform-
ant, Robert “Buchie” Smith. See id. 
 5 Id. at 340; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal proceedings, the accused shall . . . be 
confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”). 
 6 See Carson, 455 F.3d at 363–64; see also, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) 
(“[T]he rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on 
essentially equitable grounds . . . .”); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1875) (asserting 
that the defendant was “in no condition to assert that his constitutional rights ha[d] been violated” 
when the witness’s absence was due to his “wrongful procurement”). 
 7 See Carson, 455 F.3d at 347. These gang members, tried alongside Carson for several crimes 
relating to the K street criminal enterprise, were not alleged to have participated in the murder of 
Smith. Id. at 363–64. Nonetheless, the district court reasoned that Smith’s prior statements were ad-
missible against the gang members because the other K Street members jointly participated in the 
conspiracy to procure the absence of the would-be witness. Id. at 362. 
 8 Id. at 364. 
 9 Id. 
 10 See id.; United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 820 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that defendants 
forfeit their Confrontation Clause rights to face their accusers when a co-conspirator takes foreseeable  
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in United States v. Cherry, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held 
that because defendants can be held liable for the misdeeds of their co-
conspirators under conspiratorial liability theory,11 defendants might also for-
feit their Confrontation Clause rights when their co-conspirators make wit-
nesses unavailable.12 To impute this forfeiture to a co-conspirator, the govern-
ment must demonstrate that the witness interference—here, in the form of 
murder—was: (1) done in furtherance of the conspiracy; (2) within the scope 
of the unlawful project; and (3) reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or natu-
ral consequence of the unlawful agreement.13 
At first glance, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Giles v. Cali-
fornia appears to have jeopardized the Cherry doctrine, for it added a new el-
ement of intent to the forfeiture analysis.14 Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for 
the majority in Giles, opined that criminal defendants do not forfeit their Con-
frontation Clause rights simply upon a mere showing that they caused the una-
vailability of a witness.15 In addition to this but-for causation, the government 
must also demonstrate that the defendant’s actions were designed to prevent 
the witness from testifying.16 
                                                                                                                           
action that renders a prospective witness unavailable); see also United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 
950, 955 (7th Cir. 2002) (adopting the Cherry doctrine). 
 11 See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S 640, 647 (1946); see also infra notes 77−92 and ac-
companying text (describing, generally, conspiratorial liability theory). In the seminal 1946 case Pink-
erton v. United States, the Supreme Court held that members of a criminal conspiracy may be liable 
for the offenses committed by their co-conspirators. 328 U.S. at 647–48. Under the Pinkerton doc-
trine, a member will be liable for the offenses of co-conspirators if the offenses were: (1) done in 
furtherance of the conspiracy; (2) within the scope of the conspiracy; and (3) reasonably foreseeable 
as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement. Id. In the aftermath of Pinkerton, 
federal courts have continued to develop an extensive body of conspiracy law to address the unique 
issues posed by group criminality. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 
1369 (2003) (discussing the development of conspiracy law among federal courts). 
 12 217 F.3d at 821. 
 13 Id. at 820 (“By analogy to Pinkerton, mere participation in a conspiracy does not suffice—yet 
participation may suffice when combined with findings that the wrongful act at issue was in further-
ance and within the scope of an ongoing conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable as a natural or neces-
sary consequence thereof.”). 
 14 See 554 U.S. 353, 359 (2008); see Adrienne Rose, Note, Forfeiture of Confrontation Rights 
Post-Giles: Whether a Co-Conspirator’s Misconduct Can Forfeit a Defendant’s Right to Confront 
Witnesses, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 281, 285, 315–18 (2011) (concluding that the design 
requirement imposed by Giles limits the applicability of forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in the co-
conspirator context). But see infra notes 139−207 and accompanying text (arguing that the Cherry 
doctrine survives the Giles decision unscathed). 
 15 See 554 U.S. at 359, 367–68, 377 (holding that defendants must act with the design to make a 
witness unavailable in order to forfeit their Confrontation Clause rights). 
 16 Id. at 359. 
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Although some have predicted that this language will restrict the doctrine 
of forfeiture by wrongdoing in the co-conspirator context,17 this Note argues 
that the Giles decision does not disturb the doctrine’s continued application.18 
As suggested by the Tenth Circuit in Cherry, courts should freely make the 
logical inference that a conspiracy is designed to achieve all that is reasonably 
foreseeable to its members.19 Accordingly, despite the change in language, the 
thrust of the Cherry doctrine survives Giles in the co-conspirator context: so 
long as one co-conspirator’s actions were designed to make a witness unavaila-
ble, courts should freely find forfeiture for the other co-defendants if the wrong-
doing was reasonably foreseeable and within the scope of the conspiracy.20 
Part I of this Note presents the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine and ex-
plains how Cherry expanded this concept in the co-conspirator context using 
accepted ideas of conspirator liability.21 Part II examines the current status of 
the Cherry doctrine across the U.S. Courts of Appeals in an effort to determine 
what effect, if any, the Supreme Court’s decision in Giles might have on the 
doctrine’s continued applicability.22 Finally, Part III argues that the text of the 
Giles decision, other analogous doctrines, and the policies underlying the for-
feiture doctrine all support the conclusion that the Cherry doctrine should sur-
vive the Giles decision unscathed.23 
I. GROWTH OF THE CHERRY TREE: FROM SEEDS TO MARKET 
The Cherry doctrine was not created in a vacuum: instead, the doctrine 
was a solution to the increasing problem of witness intimidation that flows 
from two well-established lines of Supreme Court jurisprudence.24 First, since 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See Rose, supra note 14, at 285 (concluding that the intent requirement imposed by Giles limits 
the applicability of the Cherry forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine); The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—
Leading Cases, 122 HARV. L. REV. 276, 336, 341 (2008) (arguing that the Court’s failure in Giles to 
articulate the standard by which courts must find the requisite intent for forfeiture will produce vary-
ing results across circuits); see also Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence: Holding Batterers Account-
able for Silencing Their Victims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 857, 908 (2009) (arguing that hearsay rules are not 
consistent with the newfound Giles design requirement). 
 18 See infra notes 139–207 and accompanying text. 
 19 See 217 F.3d at 813; infra notes 139−207 and accompanying text (explaining that Cherry cor-
rectly aligned the scope of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine with the limits of Pinkerton liabil-
ity). 
 20 See Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647; Cherry, 217 F.3d at 813; infra notes 139−207 and accompany-
ing text. 
 21 See infra notes 24−111 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 112−138 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 139−207 and accompanying text. 
 24 See 217 F.3d at 816 (explaining that the Cherry doctrine is the product of “two important but 
sometimes conflicting principles: the right to confrontation is a fundamental right essential to a fair 
trial in a criminal prosecution, and courts will not suffer a party to profit by his own wrongdoing”  
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the mid-eighteenth century, the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine has provided 
an equitable limit to a defendant’s right under the Confrontation Clause to face 
his or her accusers at trial.25 At the same time, the law provides for expanded 
criminal liability where certain acts of one member of a conspiracy can be at-
tributed to other members.26 The Cherry doctrine naturally weds these con-
cepts in recognizing that the scope of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine 
should coincide with the limits of conspirator liability.27 
 Section A first examines the Confrontation Clause and the doctrine of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing.28 Then, Section B details the development of con-
spirator liability, explaining its history, justifications, and widespread ac-
ceptance.29 Finally, Section C discusses the Cherry doctrine, explaining its 
genesis and adoption across the Courts of Appeals.30 
A. The Confrontation Clause and the Doctrine of Forfeiture by Wrongdoing 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him.”31 The clause contemplates that if a witness is 
unavailable, the witness’s prior testimony shall not be introduced against a de-
fendant unless that defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the wit-
ness.32 
The right of criminal defendants to face and question their accusers at tri-
al has long been recognized as an important feature of the American criminal 
justice system.33 The roots of this right date back to Sir Walter Raleigh’s 1603 
                                                                                                                           
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also KELLY DEDEL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
OFFICE OF CMTY. POLICING SERVS., WITNESS INTIMIDATION 5 (2006) (explaining that “witness in-
timidation is pervasive and increasing”). 
 25 See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895) (“The primary object of the 
[Confrontation Clause] was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits . . . being used against the 
prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness . . . .”). 
 26 See Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647–48 (establishing the now-accepted principle that one can be 
held liable for the foreseeable misdeeds of co-conspirators). 
 27 See Cherry, 217 F.3d at 820 (holding that defendants forfeit their Confrontation Clause rights if 
the conditions of Pinkerton liability are met). 
 28 See infra notes 31−76 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 77−92 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 93−111 and accompanying text. 
 31 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 32 Giles, 554 U.S. at 358; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 33 See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965) (stating that the right to confront witness-
es is “a fundamental right essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution”). The Supreme Court has 
reinforced a defendant’s right to confront his or her witnesses as far back as 1875. See Reynolds, 98 
U.S. at 158 (acknowledging that a defendant has the right to face his or her accusers in court unless 
the witness’s absence was due to the defendant’s “wrongful procurement”). 
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trial for treason, when Raleigh unsuccessfully argued that it was unjust for a 
key witness to provide testimony ex parte without providing Raleigh the op-
portunity to cross-examine him.34 Although Raleigh was ultimately convicted 
and executed, his tragic story inspired the inclusion of a Confrontation Clause 
in the U.S. Constitution.35  
As presently conceived, the purpose of the confrontation right is to pre-
vent the “principal evil” of using ex parte testimonial examinations as evidence 
against the criminally accused.36 The skepticism regarding out-of-court state-
ments stems from the belief that their introduction in a criminal trial deprives 
the factfinder of the full story.37 Part of the jury’s function is to evaluate the 
credibility of a witness’s testimony, which requires consideration of how the 
witness acts and responds to questioning.38 Additionally, through cross-
examination a defendant may clarify confusing or misleading portions of the 
witness’s testimony.39 Cross-examination may even expose a witness’s secret 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44 (discussing Raleigh’s case). In this case, Raleigh protested the 
admission of an inculpatory letter from Lord Cobham—Raleigh’s alleged accomplice in crime—when 
Cobham did not testify at Raleigh’s trial. Id. Throughout much of the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries, such ex parte procedures were permissible and even required by the Marian bail and committal 
statutes. See id. at 43–44. Despite the normalcy of such ex parte proceedings, Raleigh famously pled 
at his trial for the opportunity to face his accuser, proclaiming that, “[t]he Proof of the Common Law 
is by witness and jury: let Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call my accuser before my face . . . .” Id. 
at 44. 
 35 See id. at 43–44 (discussing the influence of Raleigh’s trial on the Founding Fathers and the 
subsequent inclusion of the right to confront witnesses in the U.S. Constitution). 
 36 Id. at 50. An examination is “ex parte” if the adverse party is not given a fair opportunity to 
challenge or cross-examine the testimony. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 657 (9th ed. 2009). 
 37 Judson F. Falknor, Silence as Hearsay, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 192, 194 (1940). Professor Judson F. 
Falknor explained: 
 The utility of an intelligent and carefully planned cross-examination lies in its effi-
cacy in bringing to light deficiencies, first, in the witness’ observation or in his oppor-
tunity or capacity for observation of the facts about which he testifies; second, in the 
quality of his present recollection of the impressions resulting from that observation; 
third, in his testimonial expression or narration as a faithful, accurate and complete re-
production of his present recollection; and finally, in the veracity of the witness, that is 
to say, his determination—at least his willingness and desire—to faithfully, accurately 
and completely communicate to the tribunal his present recollection. 
Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id.; see California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (referring to the right of cross-
examination as “the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (citing 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM 
OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367, at 32 (3d ed. 1940)). Any fan of legal drama is 
well aware of the potential exculpatory effect of skillful cross-examination that was demonstrated in 
the 1992 film A Few Good Men. See A FEW GOOD MEN (Columbia TriStar 1992) (Tom Cruise’s 
character: “I want the truth!”; Jack Nicholson’s character: “You can’t handle the truth!”). 
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motive to lie.40 In recognizing that cross-examination potentially remedies var-
ious testimonial infirmities, the Supreme Court has regarded the confrontation 
right as essential to ensure a fair criminal trial.41 
As with all constitutional rights, however, the Confrontation Clause right to 
confront witnesses is not absolute.42 One well-established common law excep-
tion to the Confrontation Clause right is the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdo-
ing.43 Through this doctrine, the government can introduce prior statements of an 
unavailable witness against the defendant if the defendant participated in making 
the witness unavailable for trial.44 
To illustrate the application of this doctrine, suppose Dennis Defendant is 
arrested and charged with a bank robbery.45 Prior to Dennis’s trial, the police 
question Carrie Clerk—the woman who worked the bank register on the day of 
the robbery—and Carrie provides a detailed description of the perpetrator as a 
man matching Dennis’s description.46 While out on pre-trial release, Dennis—
aware of the government’s plan to call Carrie as a witness against him—tracks 
down Carrie and murders her.47 In this situation, courts have allowed Carrie’s 
prior statements to the police to be introduced against Dennis.48  
As this hypothetical illustrates, forfeiture by wrongdoing is a sensible, 
common law doctrine with an equitable basis.49 In 1997, Congress codified the 
                                                                                                                           
 40 Falknor, supra note 37, at 194 (explaining how skillful cross-examination can expose and rem-
edy common the testimonial infirmities of ambiguity, insincerity, faulty perception, and erroneous 
memory); see Green, 399 U.S. at 158 (reasoning that the right to confront witnesses through cross-
examination “protects against the lie”). 
 41 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61–62 (explaining that the Confrontation Clause ensures the reliabil-
ity of evidence by guaranteeing criminal defendants the right of cross-examination); see also Douglas 
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) (stating that a “primary interest secured by [the Confrontation 
Clause] is the right of cross-examination”); Katherine W. Grearson, Proposed Uniform Child Witness 
Testimony Act: An Impermissible Abridgement of Criminal Defendants’ Rights, 45 B.C. L. REV. 467, 
473 (2004) (explaining that cross-examination provides a defendant the opportunity to challenge a 
witness’s memory, perception, and sincerity). 
 42 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 848 (1990) (“[A] literal reading of the Confrontation 
Clause would ‘abrogate virtually every hearsay exception, a result long rejected as unintended and too 
extreme.’” (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), abrogated by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36)); 
Sarah M. Buel, Putting Forfeiture to Work, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1295, 1313 (2007) (“Although its 
purpose is to protect the accused in criminal cases, the Sixth Amendment right to confront one’s ac-
cuser is not without exception and must flex to accommodate compelling rule of law concerns.”). 
 43 Giles, 554 U.S. at 359. 
 44 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1174 (2013). 
 45 See id. The author notes that this hypothetical is meant to elucidate the principles discussed at 
length in the Corpus Juris Secundum section on criminal law. See id. 
 46 See id. 
 47 See id. 
 48 See id. 
 49 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (stating that “the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we 
accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds”); United States v. White,  
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common law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing in Rule 804(b)(6) of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.50 In language quite similar to its common law 
counterpart, the doctrine is an exception to the general rule that bars the admis-
sion of hearsay evidence.51 Although the Supreme Court has made clear that 
the Confrontation Clause and Rule 804(b)(6) are not coextensive,52 both rely 
on the principles of equity, witness protection, procedural integrity, and truth 
seeking.53 
 In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has altered its understanding 
of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, reconceiving the Confrontation 
Clause right as not simply a means of ensuring reliability, but as also as a mat-
ter of constitutional right.54 The Supreme Court first articulated its understand-
ing of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in 1980 in Ohio v. Roberts.55 Ac-
cording to the Court in Roberts, the primary purpose of the Confrontation 
Clause was to ensure the reliability of out-of-court statements when used as 
evidence against criminal defendants.56 To that end, the Court established a 
two-part test to determine the admissibility of an unavailable witness’s prior 
statements when offered against a criminal defendant: first, the declarant must 
                                                                                                                           
116 F.3d 903, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that “[s]imple equity supports a forfeiture principle”); 
United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that “courts will not suffer a 
party to profit by his own wrongdoing”); United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 272–73 (2d Cir. 
1982) (reasoning that to allow a defendant to benefit from witness tampering would “mock the very 
system of justice the confrontation clause was designed to protect”). Effectively, the doctrine of forfei-
ture by wrongdoing prevents defendants from benefiting from their egregious misconduct (i.e., wit-
ness tampering). See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. 
 50 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). This exception to the general hearsay bar provides for the admission 
of “statement[s] offered against a party that wrongfully caused—or acquiesced in wrongfully caus-
ing—the declarant’s unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result.” Id. 
 51 See id. Hearsay, defined by the Federal Rules of Evidence as any out-of-court statement offered 
for the truth of the matter asserted, is generally inadmissible because such a statement is perceived as 
untrustworthy and unreliable. See id. 801(c). There are, however, a number of exceptions and exemp-
tions that provide for the admissibility of certain out-of-court statements. See, e.g., id. 803(1)–(24); id. 
804(b)(1)–(6). 
 52 See Cherry, 217 F.3d at 816 (“While the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rules are not 
coextensive it is beyond doubt that evidentiary rules cannot abrogate constitutional rights.”). 
 53 See Giles, 554 U.S. at 374 (explaining that the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing was, at 
common law, “aimed at removing the otherwise powerful incentive for defendants to intimidate, 
bribe, and kill the witnesses against them—in other words, it is grounded in ‘the ability of courts to 
protect the integrity of their proceedings’” (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 834 (2006))). 
 54 Compare Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61, 65 (focusing on whether the statement was testimonial to 
determine its admissibility), with Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (focusing on whether the out-of-court state-
ment was reliable to determine its admissibility).  
 55 See 448 U.S. at 66. 
 56 Id. 
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have been unavailable to testify on the day of trial; 57 and second, the witness’s 
statements must have carried adequate “indicia of reliability.”58 
The Roberts approach guided the practice of lower courts for nearly twen-
ty-five years, until the Supreme Court drastically altered its analysis in its 2004 
decision in Crawford v. Washington.59 In 1999, Michael Crawford was charged 
with assault and attempted murder for stabbing Lee, a man who allegedly tried 
to rape his wife.60 Crawford claimed self defense, but his wife made a state-
ment to the police that undermined his theory by equivocating about whether 
Lee reached for a weapon.61 When Crawford’s wife was later unavailable to 
testify at Crawford’s trial for assault, the government sought to introduce her 
prior tape-recorded statement.62 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, denounced the Roberts approach 
as overly vague and highly unpredictable.63 Accordingly, the Court abandoned 
the Roberts approach entirely and replaced it with a standard that protects the 
ability of criminal defendants to exclude an unavailable witness’s prior testi-
monial statements as a matter of constitutional right, regardless of their relia-
bility.64 The only limitation imposed on the Crawford standard relates to the 
nature of the prior statement: the admissibility of the statement turns on 
whether the prior statement was testimonial.65 Accordingly, the Court abrogat-
ed Roberts and held that the admission of an unavailable declarant-witness’s 
                                                                                                                           
 57 Id. Witnesses are unavailable when they cannot be present at the trial because of death or seri-
ous illness, or when process or other reasonable means to bring them to court were unsuccessful. FED. 
R. EVID. 804(a)(4)–(5). Additionally, witnesses are unavailable in a number of other situations, even 
when they are present in the courtroom. See, e.g., id. 804(a)(1)–(3) (explaining that witnesses are 
considered unavailable if a privilege applies exempting their testimony, they refuse to testify despite a 
court order to do so, or they testify to not remembering the subject matter). 
 58 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. Under the Roberts approach, the admissibility of hearsay generally 
required a showing that the statements were admissible under a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or 
that they had “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Id. 
 59 Compare Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61, 65 (focusing on whether the statement was testimonial), 
with Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (focusing on whether the statement was reliable). 
 60 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38. 
 61 Id. at 39–40. 
 62 Id. at 40. Crawford’s wife was unavailable to testify at trial because of Washington’s marital 
privilege rule. Id. 
 63 See id. at 62–65. The unpredictable nature of the Roberts approach was exposed by the plight 
of the Crawford case through the Washington courts. See id. at 40–41. Applying the Roberts test, the 
trial court admitted the wife’s tape-recorded statement, finding that it evinced “particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness.” Id. at 40. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, and held 
that the testimony was not reliable based on its application of a Roberts-based nine-factor test. See id. 
at 41. The Washington Supreme Court, however, reversed the appeals court based on its own analysis, 
which also was ostensibly guided by Roberts. Id. With this as a backdrop, the U.S. Supreme Court 
abandoned the Roberts test. Id. at 68–69. 
 64 Id. at 60, 68–69. 
 65 Id. at 68–69. 
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non-testimonial statements would not offend the Confrontation Clause because 
the original purpose of the Clause was to prevent the use of testimonial ex 
parte examinations as evidence against the accused.66 
To elucidate the impact of the Crawford shift in emphasis—from whether 
the statements are reliable to whether they are testimonial—consider the fol-
lowing hypothetical.67 Wanda Witness sees Donny Defendant flee the scene of 
a crime.68 When questioned by Paul Policeman five minutes later, Wanda—
still flustered by what she just saw—excitedly provides a description of Donny 
that ultimately leads to his arrest.69 When Wanda is then unavailable to testify 
at Donny’s subsequent criminal trial, the government attempts to introduce the 
statement that Wanda previously made to Paul.70 
According to the Roberts approach, Wanda’s statement would likely be 
admissible.71 As Wanda was still flustered by the sight of the fleeing suspect, 
her statement was arguably an excited utterance, which is admissible under a 
deeply rooted hearsay exception.72 Further, the circumstances under which the 
                                                                                                                           
 66 Id. at 50. After declaring the Court’s new focus on whether a statement was testimonial, the 
Court held that the admission of the tape-recorded statement of Crawford’s wife violated the Confron-
tation Clause. Id. at 61. Although the Court admittedly failed to define the limits of what should be 
considered testimonial, the Court has since provided further guidance. Compare id. at 68 (“We leave 
for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”), with Williams v. 
Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2228 (2011) (holding that the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights were 
not violated when an expert witness for the prosecution testified about the results of a DNA test con-
ducted by a different out-of-state analyst because the informal conveyance of the DNA test was not 
testimonial); Melendez-Dias v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009) (holding that the admission 
of affidavits showing the results of a forensic analysis performed on seized drug samples violated the 
defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights because the affidavits were testimonial); Davis, 547 U.S. at 
820 (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not apply to non-testimonial statements, and that the 
witness’s statements made during a 911 call were not testimonial because they described an ongoing 
emergency and were not intended to be used in a future criminal prosecution). Nonetheless, what 
qualifies as testimonial remains imprecise. See, e.g., Paul W. Grimm et al., The Confrontation Clause 
and the Hearsay Rule: What Hearsay Exceptions Are Testimonial?, 40 U. BALT. L.F. 155, 157 (2010) 
(“[W]hile the Court has not articulated a comprehensive test for whether a statement is testimonial, a 
common attribute to all testimonial statements is the objective likelihood that they be used in trial.”). 
 67 See Jerome C. Latimer, Confrontation After Crawford: The Decision’s Impact on How Hearsay 
Is Analyzed Under the Confrontation Clause, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 327, 338 (2006) (discussing the 
impact of the Crawford decision on Confrontation Clause analysis). This hypothetical is meant to 
explain the implications of the Crawford decision that are discussed at length in Professor Jerome C. 
Latimer’s article Confrontation After Crawford: The Decision’s Impact on How Hearsay Is Analyzed 
Under the Confrontation Clause. See id. 
 68 See id. 
 69 See id. 
 70 See id. 
 71 See 448 U.S. at 66. 
 72 See id. The Roberts Court acknowledged four hearsay exceptions that qualify as firmly rooted: 
appropriately administered business and public records, dying declarations, and previously cross-
examined former testimony. Id. at 66 n.8. The Court, however, made clear that it did not intend this  
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statement was made suggest its reliability, as only ten minutes had passed since 
she witnessed the escape.73 
After the Crawford decision, however, it is possible that Wanda’s state-
ment to the police would not be admissible even if it were considered an excit-
ed utterance; rather than consider its reliability, a court would now evaluate 
whether Wanda’s statement was testimonial.74 Although the Court has not pro-
vided a clear standard to determine whether a statement is testimonial, a state-
ment to the police is generally considered testimonial unless—as the Court 
held in its 2006 decision in Davis v. Washington—its “primary purpose” was to 
respond to an ongoing emergency.75 Regardless, if Wanda’s statement was tes-
timonial, then it would not be admissible against Donny unless an exception—
like forfeiture by wrongdoing—applied.76 
B. The Development of Pinkerton Liability 
Even after the Crawford decision, the Supreme Court has given little guid-
ance on how the Confrontation Clause is meant to operate in the context of con-
spiracy cases.77 Entirely independent from the Confrontation Clause jurispru-
dence discussed above, courts have developed a rich body of conspiracy law in 
order to deal with the unique problem of group criminality.78 In 1946, in Pinker-
ton v. United States, the Supreme Court outlined the concept of imputable liabil-
ity in the context of criminal conspiracy.79 The doctrine of Pinkerton liability 
holds that a member of a criminal conspiracy may be liable for all offenses 
committed by co-conspirators so long as those offenses were: (1) done in fur-
therance of the conspiracy; (2) within the scope of the conspiracy; and (3) were 
reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful 
                                                                                                                           
list to be exhaustive, and stated that other exceptions—including the one for excited utterances—are 
commonly accepted as “firmly rooted” as well. Id.; see, e.g., Puleio v. Vose, 830 F.2d 1197, 1205 (1st 
Cir. 1987) (concluding that the spontaneous exclamation exception is a “firmly rooted” hearsay excep-
tion). But see Stanley A. Goldman, Distorted Vision: Spontaneous Explanation as a “Firmly Rooted” 
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 453, 462–63 (1990) (challenging the commonly 
accepted premise that the spontaneous exclamation exception should be viewed as “firmly rooted”). 
 73 See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
 74 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69. 
 75 See 547 U.S. at 822; Grimm, supra note 66, at 157. 
 76 See Giles, 554 U.S. at 359; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69. 
 77 See Timothy M. Moore, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing: A Survey and an Argument for Its Place in 
Florida, 9 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 525, 559 (2008) (explaining that although “all of the courts to ex-
plicitly consider the issue of co-conspiratorial forfeiture by wrongdoing have decided that a co-
conspirator can indeed forfeit another co-conspirator’s confrontation and hearsay rights,” uncertainty 
about the constitutional limits of forfeiture by wrongdoing remains). 
 78 See Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647–48; Katyal, supra note 11, at 1369 (discussing conspiracy law). 
 79 See 328 U.S. at 647–48. 
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agreement.80 Since its inception, Pinkerton liability has proven to be an extreme-
ly effective and powerful prosecutorial tool to combat group criminality.81 
In Pinkerton, two brothers, Daniel and Walter Pinkerton, were arrested 
and charged with conspiracy to transport and deal whisky in violation of the 
Internal Revenue Code.82 At trial, the jury found both men guilty of conspira-
cy, and also found Daniel guilty of six substantive counts despite clear evi-
dence that Daniel had no direct involvement in the conduct underlying those 
charges.83 The Supreme Court, in considering Daniel Pinkerton’s claim, 
acknowledged that although the government produced significant evidence 
regarding Walter’s involvement in the substantive offenses, they had absolutely 
no evidence suggesting that Daniel was even aware of Walter’s actions.84 In 
fact, Daniel was in jail while Walter committed a number of the substantive 
acts.85 Nonetheless, the Court upheld the convictions.86 In doing so, the Court 
held that the motive or intent of one conspirator could be imputed to other co-
conspirators to support liability for substantive crimes because the criminal 
intent to commit those crimes is established by the formation of the original 
conspiracy.87 
Since the Pinkerton decision, courts have used this doctrine expansively 
to impute both the actions and intentions of conspirators on other members of 
the conspiracy.88 Moreover, lack of actual knowledge of the underlying sub-
                                                                                                                           
 80 Id. at 647 (noting that “the overt act of one partner in crime is attributable to all,” because if a 
wrongdoing “can be supplied by the act of one conspirator, we fail to see why the same or other acts 
in furtherance of the conspiracy are likewise not attributable to the others for the purpose of holding 
them responsible for the substantive offense”); see Alex Kreit, Vicarious Liability and the Constitu-
tional Dimensions of the Pinkerton Doctrine, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 585, 598, 605 (2008) (explaining that 
the test for Pinkerton liability “had gained nearly universal acceptance among the courts” by the early 
1990s); Paul Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time to Turn Back from an Ever Expanding, Ever 
More Troubling Area, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 6 (1992) (explaining that Pinkerton concepts 
are accepted “[i]n virtually every jurisdiction in the United States”). 
 81 See Christian Davis & Eric Waters, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 523, 
525 (2007) (stating that conspiracy “is one of the most commonly charged federal crimes” and that it 
“is construed broadly by courts and, consequently, is applied by prosecutors to a variety of situa-
tions”). 
 82 328 U.S at 641. 
 83 Id. at 641, 645. 
 84 Id. at 641; id. at 648 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (highlighting that “there was [no evidence] to 
establish that Daniel participated in [the substantive offenses], aided and abetted Walter in committing 
them, or knew that he had done so”). 
 85 Id. at 648. 
 86 Id. at 647–48 (majority opinion).  
 87 Id. 
 88 Jens David Ohlin, Group Think: The Law of Conspiracy and Collective Reason, 98 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 147, 150 (2000) (“[Courts] have found ways to impute both an ‘act’ and ‘intention’ 
to the defendant sufficient to hold him liable for the substantive crimes of co-conspirators.”). 
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stantive crimes does not obviate Pinkerton liability.89 Even if specific offenses 
were not contemplated at the time that the conspiracy was formed, all members 
can be held liable so long as the aforementioned requirements are met.90 Once 
individuals join a conspiracy, they are not indefinitely subject to imputed lia-
bility for all future acts of their cohorts: they may remove themselves from a 
conspiracy—and thus avoid conspiratorial liability—through an affirmative act 
of disengagement.91 
In short, Pinkerton unequivocally established that liability might be im-
puted to co-conspirators when certain requirements are met, but the decision 
left open the question of whether forfeiture of confrontation rights may also be 
imputed in such circumstances.92 
C. The Cherry Doctrine 
Courts have extended the principles of Pinkerton liability to provide for 
forfeiture of defendants’ Confrontation Clause rights through the wrongdoing of 
their co-conspirators.93 In Cherry, the Tenth Circuit ruled that a defendant for-
feited his right to confront a particular witness when his co-conspirator made 
that witness unavailable.94 In the case, the government charged five defend-
ants—including Michelle Cherry and Joshua Price—with involvement in a drug 
conspiracy.95 Much of the government’s evidence of the drug conspiracy came 
from a government witness named Ebon Lurks.96 Shortly after Price learned of 
Lurks’s cooperation—but before Price’s trial—Price found Lurks and killed 
him.97 
At a pretrial suppression hearing, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Oklahoma determined that although Lurks’s prior statements could 
                                                                                                                           
 89 James F. Flanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing and Those Who Acquiesce in Witness Intimida-
tion: A Reach Exceeding Its Grasp and Other Problems with Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), 51 
DRAKE L. REV. 459, 516 (2003) (“Coconspirators may be liable for crimes in which they did not di-
rectly participate or were unaware were being planned and had no ability to influence, provided there 
is evidence that the murder was an object of the conspiracy.”). 
 90 See id. 
 91 Davis & Waters, supra note 81, at 539–40 (stating that in order for a conspirator to withdraw 
from a conspiracy, the conspirator “must do more than merely cease participation; the conspirator 
must commit ‘[a]ffirmative acts inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy and [communicate 
them] in a manner reasonably calculated to reach co-conspirators.’” (quoting United States v. U.S. 
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 464 (1978))). 
 92 See 328 U.S. at 647. 
 93 See, e.g., Thompson, 286 F.3d at 955; Cherry, 217 F.3d at 820. 
 94 217 F.3d at 820. 
 95 Id. at 813. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 814. 
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be introduced against Price, Lurks’s statements could not be introduced against 
the other co-conspirators—including Cherry.98 The court reasoned that exclud-
ing Lurks’s statements against the co-conspirators was necessary because the 
government did not show that Price’s co-conspirators had participated directly 
in Lurks’s murder or that they had sufficient knowledge thereof.99 In response, 
the government filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the district court’s 
suppression of these statements.100 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and expanded 
Pinkerton’s imputed liability concept to the context of forfeiture of Confronta-
tion Clause rights.101 The court held that a defendant forfeits his or her Con-
frontation Clause rights if a preponderance of the evidence establishes either 
that the defendant directly participated in making the witness unavailable 
through wrongdoing, or that the conditions of Pinkerton liability were met.102 
Thus, where co-conspirators render a witness unavailable through wrongdoing, 
their actions may be imputed to the defendant and thereby cause that defendant 
to forfeit his or her Confrontation Clause rights.103 
The Cherry court made explicit that defendants do not need actual 
knowledge of their co-conspirators’ misconduct to forfeit their Confrontation 
Clause rights.104 Because Pinkerton concepts serve to impute the requisite intent, 
defendants’ involvement in the broader conspiracy justifies forfeiture of their 
Confrontation Clause rights.105 Further, the court clarified that the scope of a 
conspiracy is not necessarily limited to its primary goal, but also may include 
“secondary goals relevant to the evasion of apprehension and prosecution.”106 
The killing of witnesses, the court explained, was within the scope of the con-
spiracy in Cherry because it furthered these secondary goals.107 Thus, Price’s 
intent to prevent Lurks’s testimony was imputed to Cherry, and Cherry therefore 
forfeited her confrontation right as a natural consequence of her involvement in 
                                                                                                                           
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id.  
 101 Id. at 821 (“Actual knowledge is not required for conspiratorial waiver by misconduct if the 
elements of Pinkerton—scope, furtherance, and reasonable foreseeability as a necessary or natural 
consequence—are satisfied.”). 
 102 Id. at 820. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 821. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. That the scope of a conspiracy encompasses the pursuit of secondary goals is accepted in 
modern conspiracy law as well. See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 102 F.3d 1078, 1083 (10th Cir. 
1996) (holding that an escape effort following a bank robbery was a secondary goal that was part of 
the primary effort to successfully commit the bank robbery). 
 107 See 217 F.3d at 821. 
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the underlying conspiracy.108 Effectively, the Cherry decision extended the for-
feiture by wrongdoing doctrine to its logical consequence, rendering forfeiture as 
entirely coextensive with the limits of Pinkerton liability.109 
In the wake of the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Cherry, various courts have 
accepted the logic of the decision and found the Cherry doctrine to be persua-
sive.110 Although some Courts of Appeals are less explicit in their acceptance 
of the doctrine, and others have yet to embrace or reject it, on the whole the 
Cherry scheme is widely accepted among the courts.111 
II. AFTER GILES: IS THE CHERRY DOCTRINE STILL ON TOP? 
Nearly a decade after the Tenth Circuit’s promulgation of the Cherry doc-
trine, the Supreme Court drastically refined its understanding and articulation 
of the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing in its 2008 decision in Giles v. Cal-
ifornia.112 Prior to Giles, the Courts of Appeals widely adopted the Cherry 
scheme.113 As such, courts considered only the result of a defendant’s miscon-
                                                                                                                           
 108 See id. 
 109 See infra notes 139−207 and accompanying text (justifying the continued vitality of the Cher-
ry doctrine). 
 110 See, e.g., United States v. Dinkins, 691 F.3d 358, 384–85 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. 
Ct. 1278 (2013); United States v. Bakersfield, 448 F. App’x 243, 250 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Johnson, 495 F.3d 951, 971 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Stewart, 485 F.3d 666, 671 (2d Cir. 
2007); United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Rodriguez-
Marrero, 390 F.3d 1, 17 n.8 (1st Cir. 2004); Thompson, 286 F.3d at 955. 
 111 Compare Stewart, 485 F.3d at 671 (effectively recognizing the Cherry doctrine by embracing 
proof of knowledge and intent by circumstantial evidence), with Thompson, 286 F.3d at 955 (explicit-
ly accepting the Cherry doctrine). To date, the Fourth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have explicitly 
adopted the Cherry doctrine; the First, Second, and Third Circuits have indicated support for the doc-
trine, albeit indirectly; and the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have yet to comment. See 
infra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing the approach to Cherry taken by the various circuit 
courts). The Eighth Circuit is the only one to have expressed disapproval of the Cherry doctrine, but 
has since appeared to have accepted its underlying logic. Compare Johnson, 495 F.3d at 971 (citing 
Cherry for the proposition that the forfeiture concept is coextensive with criminal liability), with Ol-
son v. Green, 668 F.2d 421, 429 (8th Cir. 1982) (upholding a defendant’s right to confront a witness 
who did not appear in court after the defendant’s co-conspirator threatened her). 
 112 See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359 (2008) (requiring that the defendant act with the 
design to make the witness unavailable); United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 821 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 113 See United States v. Bakersfield, 448 F. App’x 243, 250 (3d Cir. 2011) (effectively accepting 
the Cherry doctrine by applying forfeiture despite a defendant’s lack of direct involvement in a wit-
ness’s murder); United States v. Johnson, 495 F.3d 951, 971 (8th Cir. 2007) (effectively accepting the 
Cherry doctrine by applying forfeiture despite a defendant’s lack of major involvement in a witness’s 
murder); United States v. Stewart, 485 F.3d 666, 671 (2d Cir. 2007) (effectively accepting the Cherry 
doctrine by allowing knowledge and intent to be demonstrated by circumstantial evidence); United 
States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (explicitly adopting the Cherry doctrine); United 
States v. Rodriguez-Marrero, 390 F.3d 1, 17 n.8 (1st Cir. 2004) (suggesting in dicta the court’s ac- 
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duct—whether he or she made the witness unavailable—in determining 
whether to apply the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine.114 In Giles, however, 
the Supreme Court held that in order for a defendant to forfeit his or her Con-
frontation Clause rights, it is not enough that the witness was made unavailable 
as a result of the defendant’s conduct.115 Under Giles, a defendant forfeits Con-
frontation Clause rights only if, in making the witness unavailable, he or she 
acted with the design to make the witness unavailable.116 
The Giles Court held that the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine does not 
apply without an additional finding of fact indicating that the defendant’s de-
sign was to make the witness unavailable to testify.117 The Court reasoned that 
the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing was a Founding-era exception to the 
Confrontation Clause that requires more than just the overt act of making a 
witness unavailable.118 This original understanding, the Court explained, rec-
ognized forfeiture by wrongdoing only when a defendant acted with the design 
to prevent a witness from testifying.119 The Court held that if the government 
                                                                                                                           
ceptance of the Cherry doctrine); United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 955 (7th Cir. 2002) (ex-
plicitly adopting the Cherry doctrine). 
 114 See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 2005) (“There is no re-
quirement that a defendant who prevents a witness from testifying against him through his own 
wrongdoing only forfeits his right to confront the witness where, in procuring the witness’s unavaila-
bility, he intended to prevent the witness from testifying.”). 
 115 554 U.S. at 359. 
 116 Id. In Giles, the Court considered the plight of Dwayne Giles, who shot and killed his ex-
girlfriend Brenda Avie and claimed self-defense at trial. Id. at 356. To defeat this claim, the govern-
ment sought to introduce statements that Avie had made to a police officer following a domestic vio-
lence incident roughly three weeks prior to her murder. Id. Avie told the police officer that Giles ac-
cused her of cheating on him, grabbed her by the shirt, choked her, punched her in the face, and 
threatened to kill her. Id. at 356–57. The trial court admitted her statements into evidence, and the jury 
convicted Giles of first-degree murder. Id. at 357. On appeal, the California Court of Appeals upheld 
the conviction, holding that Avie’s prior statements were admissible against Giles under the forfeiture 
by wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause. Id. The California Supreme Court later af-
firmed that decision. Id. 
 117 Id. at 365. 
 118 Id. at 359, 368 (describing the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine as a product of common law 
with “roots” dating back to the practices of the seventeenth century). 
 119 Id.To support its imposition of the design requirement, the court cited a number of historical 
sources. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 148, 158 (1875) holding that the defendant 
was “in no condition to assert that his constitutional rights ha[d] been violated” when the witness’s 
absence was due to his “wrongful procurement”); Lord Morley’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 769, 771–77 
(H.L. 1666) (asserting an early version of the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing in holding that the 
sworn statements taken by a coroner of three witnesses could be admitted against a defendant despite 
the witnesses’ unavailability because the witnesses were either “dead” or “withdrawn by the procure-
ment of the prisoner”); 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 429 (Lon-
don, E. Nutt & R. Gosling 1721) (asserting that it was “settled” law that prior statements taken at a 
coroner’s inquest “may be given in Evidence at the Trial . . . [if the witness] is dead, or unable to trav-
el, or kept away by the Means or Procurement of the Prisoner”); EDMUND POWELL, PRACTICE OF THE  
2014] The Viability of the Cherry Doctrine Post-Giles 317 
could not demonstrate that Giles acted with the requisite intent (i.e., the design 
to make the witness unavailable), then the witness’s prior statements could not 
be introduced against him.120 
As noted by some commenters, this newfound focus on design could po-
tentially limit the scope of the Cherry doctrine.121 Conceivably, the design re-
quirement introduced in Giles is stricter than the traditional limits of co-
conspirator liability set by the Supreme Court in 1946 in Pinkerton v. United 
States.122 By emphasizing the design or intent of the defendant, the Giles deci-
sion arguably confined the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine to situations in 
which a defendant personally and specifically intended to make a witness una-
vailable.123 If the notion of design is so narrowly construed, then instances in 
which a co-conspirator’s misconduct results in forfeiture may be limited.124 
Despite Giles’s introduction of this intent element into the forfeiture anal-
ysis, the effect of this wrinkle on the scope of the forfeiture doctrine in the co-
conspirator context remains unclear.125 Importantly, the Giles decision did not 
explicitly state whether this design element could continue to be imputed to the 
                                                                                                                           
LAW OF EVIDENCE 166 (1858) (stating that the forfeiture rule applied when a witness “had been kept 
out of the way by the prisoner, or by some one on the prisoner’s behalf, in order to prevent him from 
giving evidence against him”). But see Thomas Y. Davies, Selective Originalism: Sorting Out Which 
Aspects of Giles’s Forfeiture Exception to Confrontation Were or Were Not “Established at the Time 
of the Founding,” 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 605, 670–72 (2009) (arguing that Justice Scalia’s re-
view of history in the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington was inaccurate, 
noting that “originalism is merely a rhetorical pretense under which justices justify their personal 
predilections by falsely claiming fidelity to historical meaning, while actually ignoring or altering the 
historical meaning”). 
 120 Giles, 554 U.S. at 377. The California courts determined that a retrial was necessary. See Peo-
ple v. Giles, No. B224629, 2012 WL 130659, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2012), reh’g denied (Feb. 
17, 2012), review denied (Apr. 11, 2012). At retrial, Giles was again convicted, and this time the pros-
ecution chose to not introduce Avie’s prior statement in its case in chief. Id. 
 121 See Rose, supra note 14, at 285, 315–18 (arguing that the design requirement imposed by 
Giles limits the applicability of forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in the co-conspirator context); see 
also Lininger, supra note 17, at 908 (arguing that hearsay rules are not consistent with the newfound 
Giles design requirement). 
 122 See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S 640, 647 (1946); Rose, supra note 14, at 285, 315–18. 
Under the Cherry doctrine, whether a defendant forfeit his or her Confrontation Clause rights depends 
on the traditional limits of conspiratorial liability as established in Pinkerton—i.e., whether the 
wrongful procurement of the witness’s absence was in furtherance, within the scope, and reasonably 
foreseeable as a necessary or natural consequence of the conspiracy. See Cherry, 217 F.3d at 821 
(citing Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647). 
 123 See Rose, supra note 14, at 285, 315–18. 
 124 See id.  
 125 Compare United States v. Dinkins, 691 F.3d 358, 384–85 (4th Cir. 2012) (applying the Cherry 
doctrine post-Giles), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1278 (2013), with Rose, supra note 14, at 285, 315–18 
(arguing that the design requirement imposed by Giles limits the applicability of forfeiture by wrong-
doing doctrine in the co-conspirator context). 
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defendant by the actions of co-conspirators.126 If the notion of design is under-
stood to be coextensive with the limits of Pinkerton liability—such that a con-
spiracy is designed to achieve all that it might foreseeably accomplish—then 
Giles will not limit the applicability of the Cherry doctrine in the co-
conspirator context.127 If, however, the notion of design is instead understood 
more narrowly, then the scope of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine may be 
severely limited.128 
In 2012 in United States v. Dinkins, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit explicitly endorsed the Cherry doctrine’s continued viability.129 
In Dinkins, members of a Baltimore narcotics organization known as “Special” 
were charged in a twelve-count indictment for narcotics trafficking and various 
acts of violence, including murder.130 James Dinkins served as an enforcer for 
the organization, committing murders for hire.131 After Dinkins had already 
been arrested in 2005, other members of Special murdered John Dowery—a 
former Special drug dealer who had been providing detailed information to law 
enforcement officers about the organization for nearly a year.132 
In affirming the introduction of Dowery’s statements at Dinkins’s crimi-
nal trial, the Fourth Circuit held that the concepts of Cherry remain viable 
post-Giles.133 The court even cited to Giles as support for imputing forfeiture 
of Dinkins’s confrontation right.134 Although the court confirmed the limita-
tions that Cherry and its progeny suggest—that “[m]ere participation in a con-
spiracy will not trigger the admission of testimonial statements under a forfei-
ture-by-wrongdoing theory”—the court embraced the thrust of the Cherry doc-
trine.135 
                                                                                                                           
 126 See 554 U.S. at 377. 
 127 See Dinkins, 691 F.3d at 384–85 (applying the Cherry doctrine post-Giles); see infra notes 
139−207 and accompanying text (arguing why the Giles design requirement should not limit the scope 
of the Cherry doctrine). 
 128 See Rose, supra note 14, at 285, 315−18. But see Dinkins, 691 F.3d at 384–85 (affirming an 
application of the Cherry doctrine post-Giles). 
 129 See 691 F.3d at 384–85. 
 130 Id. at 362−63. 
 131 Id. at 363. 
 132 Id. at 365. Dowery had earned the reputation of being a “snitch” for his incriminating testimo-
ny against another member of Special. Id. at 364. 
 133 Id. at 383−84. 
 134 Id. at 383, 385 (stating that “[t]he Giles decision did not materially alter application of the 
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception” and that “application of principles of conspiratorial liability in 
the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing context strikes the appropriate balance between the competing interests 
involved” (citing Giles, 554 U.S. at 367−68; Thompson, 286 F.3d. at 963−64)). 
 135 Id. at 385 (holding—consistent with the Cherry doctrine—that defendants forfeit their con-
frontation rights when “(1) [they] participated directly in planning or procuring the declarant’s una- 
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Notably, upon petition for review, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
Dinkins in February 2013.136 Although nothing dispositive can typically be 
gleaned from a denial of certiorari, it appears the Supreme Court has tacitly 
endorsed the continued vitality of the Cherry doctrine in the post-Giles era.137 
Further, the lack of any counter-instructive case law on this issue suggests that 
the lower courts agree that the Giles decision has not had any effect on the 
continued viability of the Cherry doctrine.138 
III. THE CONTINUED VIABILITY OF THE CHERRY DOCTRINE 
In 2008 in Giles v. California, the Supreme Court held that for defendants 
to forfeit their right to confront a particular witness, they must act with the 
requisite intent—i.e., design—to make that witness unavailable.139 Before 
Giles, the Cherry doctrine supported the forfeiture of confrontation rights by 
enabling courts to impute the misconduct of co-conspirators.140 After Giles, 
however, imputing misconduct is not enough to sustain forfeiture; courts now 
must also impute the intent of co-conspirators to make witnesses unavaila-
ble.141 
This Part argues that the Cherry doctrine survives the Giles Court’s new-
found emphasis on a defendant’s specific intent to procure a witness’s unavail-
ability.142 Section A considers the text of the Supreme Court’s decision in Giles 
and suggests that the Court’s reference to context indicates that a gang’s vio-
lent reputation may support the inference that the defendant shared his or her 
co-conspirators’ design to make a witness unavailable.143 Section B seeks 
guidance from other areas of law in which intent is similarly at issue and finds 
that the Cherry doctrine’s continued vitality is supported by analogy.144 Finally, 
Section C considers the policy implications that result from a failure to extend 
the vitality of the Cherry doctrine and concludes that the doctrine is both nor-
matively desirable and logically compelled.145 
                                                                                                                           
vailability through wrongdoing; or (2) the wrongful procurement was in furtherance, within the scope, 
and reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or natural consequence of an ongoing conspiracy”). 
 136 See Dinkins v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1278 (2013). 
 137 See id. 
 138 See Dinkins, 691 F.3d at 384–85 (affirming an application of the Cherry doctrine post-Giles).  
 139 Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359, 365 (2008). 
 140 See id.; United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 821 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 141 See 554 U.S. at 359, 365. 
 142 See infra notes 146−407 and accompanying text. 
 143 See infra notes 146−154 and accompanying text. 
 144 See infra notes 155−176 and accompanying text. 
 145 See infra notes 177−207 and accompanying text. 
320 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:301 
A. Jiving with Giles: Textual Support for the Cherry Doctrine 
The Giles decision provides supports for the continued viability of the 
Cherry doctrine.146 Justice Scalia, concerned that courts would misapply the 
newfound intent requirement to severely limit the forfeiture by wrongdoing 
doctrine, made a point to assert the doctrine’s continued vitality in the domes-
tic violence setting.147 Anticipating the dissents’ arguments, Justice Scalia em-
phasized that context is “highly relevant” to the assessment of whether the de-
fendant’s intent should be inferred so to justify forfeiture.148 Acknowledging 
the difficulties that this newfound intent requirement might present in cases in 
which previously abusive relationships culminated in murder, Justice Scalia 
explicitly instructed that courts should be willing to infer defendants’ intent to 
make would-be witnesses unavailable from the context of the abusive relation-
ship, particularly by paying special attention to defendants’ prior threats of 
abuse.149 
This logic from the domestic violence context suggests that in the context 
of a violent drug conspiracy, a gang’s reputation of silencing witnesses could 
be similarly relevant.150 Modern criminal enterprises often seek to foster vio-
lent reputations because their continued operations depend on unbroken codes 
of silence.151 The Cherry doctrine has proven especially useful to prosecutors 
                                                                                                                           
 146 See 554 U.S. at 377. 
 147 See id. 
 148 See id. (“Where such an abusive relationship culminates in murder, the evidence may support 
a finding that the crime expressed the intent to isolate the victim and to stop her from reporting abuse 
to the authorities or cooperating with a criminal prosecution—rendering her prior statements admissi-
ble under the forfeiture doctrine.”). 
 149 See id. (“Earlier abuse, or threats of abuse, intended to dissuade the victim from resorting to 
outside help would be highly relevant to this inquiry, as would evidence of ongoing criminal proceed-
ings at which the victim would have been expected to testify.”). Despite Justice Scalia’s instruction 
that courts should freely infer a defendant’s intent to make would-be witnesses unavailable in the 
domestic violence context, the scope of a defendant’s design remains hotly disputed. Compare Marc 
McAllister, Down but Not Out: Why Giles Leaves Forfeiture by Wrongdoing Still Standing, 59 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 393, 409 (2009) (arguing that although Giles added an intent requirement to the for-
feiture analysis, “the majority arguably retreated from its freshly-minted rule by declaring that the 
rule’s requisite intent may be inferred in domestic abuse cases”), with G. Kristian Miccio, Commen-
tary, Giles v. California: Is Justice Scalia Hostile to Battered Women?, 87 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 93, 
103 (2009), http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-content/uploads/Miccio-87-TLRSA-93.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7V8U-XZ7T (arguing that the new Giles intent requirement will severely limit the 
scope of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in the domestic violence context). 
 150 See Flanagan, supra note 89, at 516−17 (“[M]embers of a criminal organization, with a reputa-
tion for violent discipline, are responsible for those murders and the consequent loss of constitutional 
and evidentiary rights.”). 
 151 See, e.g., United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336, 364 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that forfeiture 
was supported despite “no direct evidence of an explicit agreement to kill adverse witnesses” because 
such an agreement could be inferred from the gang’s prior acts of violence); LETIZIA PAOLI, MAFIA  
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who deal with modern-day drug conspiracies because these gangs’ implicit 
enforcement policies are often successful in discouraging witnesses from testi-
fying against members at trial.152 As gang reputations have traditionally been 
used to support the inference of Pinkerton liability, these reputations similarly 
support the inference of forfeiture under the Cherry regime.153 Accordingly, 
despite the Court’s newfound intent requirement to permit forfeiture, the text 
of the Giles decision suggests that this intent may be inferable from a gang’s 
violent reputation.154 
B. Imputation of Intent: Guidance by Analogy 
Analyzing other areas of law in which intent is similarly at issue can 
guide the assessment of the Cherry doctrine’s vitality following the Giles 
Court’s newfound focus on design.155 A review of three legal principles—
transferred intent, the felony-murder doctrine, and the accepted use of Pinker-
ton concepts to impute specific intent for the purposes of liability—all suggest 
that Pinkerton concepts also operate to impute the intent necessary for forfei-
ture by wrongdoing.156 Accordingly, it appears that the Cherry doctrine sur-
vives the Giles decision unscathed.157 
Courts have created various doctrines that satisfy the mens rea elements 
of crimes, even where the specific intent of an individual defendant appears to 
                                                                                                                           
BROTHERHOODS: ORGANIZED CRIME, ITALIAN STYLE 109 (2003) (discussing the Italian Mafia’s 
codification of this sort of bond in a word: omertà). Under these unwritten—but actively enforced—
codes of silence, individuals are expected to absolutely avoid speaking to authorities regarding crimi-
nal activity, and breaking this silence is punishable by death. PAOLI, supra; see also THE GAME, STOP 
SNITCHIN, STOP LYIN (Black Wall Street Records 2005) (an example of omertà in hip-hop culture). 
 152 See Flanagan, supra note 89, at 516−17 (“Conspiracies often have explicit or implicit en-
forcement policies which [provide evidence that murder was reasonably foreseeable].”). 
 153 Compare United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 966 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the 
witness’s murder was not reasonably foreseeable to the defendant because “there [was] no evidence 
that this conspiracy had previously engaged in murder or attempted murder”), with United States v. 
Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 669 (2d Cir. 1997) (concluding that the murder of a witness was reasonably 
foreseeable where “there was an abundance of evidence that the [gang] made it a practice to murder 
members whose cooperation with authorities was suspected or who posed a threats to the gang’s oper-
ations”). 
 154 See 554 U.S. at 377; Flanagan, supra note 89, 516−17. 
 155 See Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of 
Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 934, 963−66 (1996) (analyzing the utility of 
analogy in constructing legal argument). 
 156 See infra notes 158−176 and accompanying text (analyzing the doctrines of transferred intent, 
felony murder, and Pinkerton liability). 
 157 See infra notes 158−176 and accompanying text (concluding that the doctrines of transferred 
intent, felony murder, and Pinkerton liability all support the continued vitality of the Cherry doctrine 
post-Giles). 
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be lacking.158 One such doctrine, transferred intent, is common to both tort and 
criminal law.159 Essentially, the doctrine of transferred intent allows an actor to 
be guilty of a crime that requires specific intent—for example, murder—even 
if the actual victim of the crime was not the actor’s intended target.160 Consider 
this hypothetical: Madman shoots a gun at Alfred but hits and kills Brutus by 
mistake.161 The doctrine of transferred intent allows for Madman to be found 
guilty of murder even though he did not have the specific intent to harm the 
ultimate victim, Brutus.162 Although a required element of first-degree mur-
der—the intent to kill Brutus—is lacking, this element is satisfied through the 
doctrine of transferred intent.163 
In addition to transferred intent, the doctrine of felony murder also provides 
for liability despite the absence of specific intent.164 Effectively, this doctrine 
fictitiously transforms an individual’s intent to commit a dangerous felony into 
the intent to commit murder.165 According to this doctrine, when a victim dies as 
a result of an offender committing a dangerous felony, the offender is guilty of 
murder even if the killing was an accident and the offender lacked the specific 
intent to kill.166 This principle is essentially an extended application of the doc-
                                                                                                                           
 158 See GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 285–96 (1978) (discussing the doctrine 
of felony murder); Douglas Husak, Transferred Intent, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 
65, 66–67 (1996) (discussing the concept of transferred intent); Colin Miller, The Purpose-Driven 
Rule: Drew Peterson, Giles v. California, and the Transferred Intent Doctrine of Forfeiture by 
Wrongdoing, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 228, 230 (2012), http://columbialawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/228_Miller.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/R39A-KPMT (arguing that the 
Giles court endorsed a transferred-intent doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing). Mens rea is “[t]he 
state of mind that the prosecution, to secure a conviction, must prove that a defendant had when com-
mitting a crime.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 1075. 
 159 See Husak, supra note 158, at 66−67 (explaining the basis and limitations of transferred in-
tent); Elizabeth F. Harris, Recent Decisions, 56 MD. L. REV. 744, 747−48 (1997) (same). 
 160 See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 75 (2005) (stating that “the culpability of a 
scheme designed to implement the calculated decision to kill is not altered by the fact that the scheme 
is directed at someone other than the actual victim” (quoting State v. Richey, 595 N.E.2d 915, 925 
(Ohio 1992), abrogated by State v. McGuire, 686 N.E.2d 1112 (Ohio 1997)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); State v. Batson, 96 S.W.2d 384, 389 (Mo. 1936) (“The intention follows the bullet” (cita-
tions omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 161 See Harris, supra note 159, at 747–48 (relying on a similar hypothetical). 
 162 See id. 
 163 See id. 
 164 See FLETCHER, supra note 158, at 285–96 (explaining the operation of the doctrine of felony 
murder). 
 165 See id. 
 166 See Erwin S. Barbre, Annotation, What Felonies Are Inherently or Foreseeably Dangerous to 
Human Life for Purposes of Felony-Murder Doctrine, 50 A.L.R. 3d 397 (1973). Note that in most 
jurisdictions, not all felonies qualify for felony-murder status. Id. Generally, the underlying felony 
must present a foreseeable danger to life, and the link between the felony and the death must not be 
too remote. Id. 
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trine of transferred intent: the culpability associated with an individual’s wrong-
ful intended action is constructively transferred to account for certain wrongful 
but unintended results.167 Although the doctrine of felony murder is not without 
its own critics,168 it nonetheless remains the law in the majority of American ju-
risdictions.169 
In addition to these legal maneuvers, the concept of Pinkerton liability is 
routinely used to support convictions even where the actor’s intent is an ele-
ment of the crime.170 For example, in 1985 in United States v. Alvarez, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit utilized Pinkerton concepts to im-
pose vicarious liability on the defendant for certain “unintended” consequences 
of the drug conspiracy in which he was involved.171 In affirming the defend-
ants’ convictions for second-degree murder, the Eleventh Circuit recognized 
that Pinkerton liability extended even to substantive crimes that were not with-
in the originally intended scope of the conspiracy so long as they were reason-
ably foreseeable.172 Strictly speaking, the conspiracy members convicted of 
murder did not possess the requisite intent to kill.173 Nonetheless, because 
murder was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of their involvement in such 
a dangerous drug conspiracy, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the intent 
requirement of the defendant’s murder charge was satisfied.174 
The doctrines of transferred intent, felony murder, and Pinkerton liability 
all excuse situations in which a mens rea element is lacking in order to justify 
the imposition of criminal liability.175 Looking to these legal doctrines for 
                                                                                                                           
 167 See People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 133 (Cal. 1965) (en banc) (stating that “inadvertent 
or accidental killings are first degree murders when committed by felons in the perpetration of rob-
bery”). For a detailed discussion of the purpose and limits of the felony-murder doctrine, see Guyora 
Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965, 971–72 (2008). 
 168 See e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6 (1985); JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING 
CRIMINAL LAW § 31.06(A), at 557 (4th ed. 2006) (arguing that unintended and unforeseen deaths 
cannot be deterred); Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 680, 695–96 (1994) (labeling the felony-murder doctrine as a “ration-
ally indefensible doctrine” due to its incongruence with the general goals of deterrence and punishing 
according to culpability). 
 169 Guyora Binder, Making the Best of Felony Murder, 91 B.U. L. REV. 403, 551 (2011). 
 170 See e.g., United States v. Bingham, 653 F.3d 983, 998 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that there was 
sufficient evidence to support a conviction for murder in aid of racketeering on a Pinkerton theory of 
liability); United States v. Lloyd, 947 F. Supp. 2d 259, 266 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that the evidence 
was sufficient to support a conviction for armed robbery on a Pinkerton theory of liability). 
 171 755 F.2d 830, 848–49 (11th Cir. 1985). In Alvarez, an undercover agent was killed as the 
result of a drug deal gone awry, and three members of the ongoing conspiracy who were not present at 
the shootout were tried and convicted for second-degree murder. Id. 
 172 Id. at 851. 
 173 See id. 
 174 Id. 
 175 See supra notes 158−174 and accompanying text. 
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guidance, courts should use the Cherry doctrine to similarly satisfy the new-
found intent requirement imposed by Giles.176 
C. Policy—Discouraging Potentially Dangerous Conspiracies 
In addition to text and analogy, strong policy considerations further sup-
port the continued vitality of the Cherry doctrine.177 Witness intimidation is a 
significant problem throughout the United States, and violence toward poten-
tial cooperating witnesses has become an integral part of normal gang behav-
ior.178 Although various strategies exist to offset the impact of gang-related 
witness intimidation, the violence persists and continues to occur at an alarm-
ingly high rate.179 
One legal solution to this devastating problem is Cherry’s extension of 
the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine to encompass certain misconduct of co-
conspirators.180 The doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing is premised on the 
proposition that defendants should not be able to benefit from their own mis-
conduct.181 In order to protect the integrity of the criminal justice system, any 
incentives that criminals have to engage in witness tampering should be negat-
ed.182 By disrupting the free functioning nature of the adversary process, per-
vasive witness tampering has the potential to undermine the legitimacy of the 
entire criminal justice system.183 
                                                                                                                           
 176 See supra notes 155−174 and accompanying text. 
 177 See infra notes 178−207 and accompanying text (arguing that the continued vitality of the 
Cherry doctrine advances the policy goals of fighting witness intimidation and deterring crime). 
 178 PETER FINN & KERRY MURPHY HEALEY, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, PREVENTING GANG- AND 
DRUG-RELATED WITNESS INTIMIDATION 2 (1996). 
 179 John Anderson, Gang-Related Witness Intimidation, NAT’L GANG CTR. BULL., Feb. 2007, at 1, 
1, available at http://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/content/documents/gang-related-witness-intimidation.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9A8J-S6J5 (“Traditionally used strategies include intensive witness 
management, immediate apprehension and aggressive prosecution of intimidators, setting high bail in 
cases of gang violence (especially gang-related witness intimidation), creation and use of influential 
victim/witness assistance programs, and occasional relocation of threatened witnesses.”). 
 180 See id. (“Promising new approaches include . . . amending the rules of evidence in some states 
to allow the admission of a prior sworn statement or grand-jury testimony if the defendant causes the 
witness to be unavailable.”). 
 181 See Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232–33 (1959) (stating that the princi-
ple that “no man may take advantage of his own wrong” is “[d]eeply rooted in our jurisprudence”); 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 159 (1878) (“The [doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing] has 
its foundation in the maxim that no one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong.”). 
 182 See Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982) (suggesting that courts should “[pro-
tect] the integrity of the adversary process by deterring litigants from acting on strong incentives to 
prevent the testimony of an adverse witness”). 
 183 See id.; Anderson, supra note 179, at 1. 
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Accordingly—from a normative perspective—any policy that will poten-
tially reduce the incidence of witness intimidation should be strongly consid-
ered.184 Aligning forfeiture doctrine with the limits of conspiracy liability is 
consistent with deterrence theory—a consequentialist approach to shaping 
conduct that appears throughout the legal system.185 Although some scholars 
tend to resist consequentialist theory when it is taken to the extreme, it is un-
deniable that laws are partly designed to shape individual conduct.186 
A forfeiture doctrine that is coextensive with the limits of Pinkerton lia-
bility will deter crime in two ways.187 First, as a consequence of a broader for-
feiture doctrine, individuals will be deterred from ever joining dangerous con-
spiracies in the first place.188 Aware of the severe consequences that a defend-
ant’s involvement in the conspiracy will bring, a would-be conspirator may opt 
out entirely to avoid the risk of incurring their own criminal liability.189 Natu-
rally, the greater the consequences that individuals face for their criminal be-
havior, the greater deterrent effect that the law should have on those individu-
als.190 
More pointedly, individuals who are already members of a conspiracy 
will be deterred from engaging in witness intimidation if the law is able to strip 
away the benefit that would follow from procuring their witnesses’ absenc-
                                                                                                                           
 184 See Katyal, supra note 11, at 1340, 1372–75 (highlighting the harms spared and benefits 
gained from expansive conspiracy liability as established in Pinkerton). 
 185 See id. Deterrence theory underlies the notion of Pinkerton liability—i.e., deterring bad behav-
ior and incentivizing good behavior. See Kyron Huigens, The Dead End of Deterrence, and Beyond, 
41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 954–55 (2000) (“Under consequentialist ethics, punishment is justified 
by the deterrence of harm or, more broadly, by the promotion of social welfare.”); see, e.g., United 
States v. Dinkins, 691 F.3d 358, 383, 385 (4th Cir. 2012) (embracing the Cherry doctrine post-Giles 
because it strikes the “appropriate balance between the competing interests involved”), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 1278 (2013). 
 186 See Huigens, supra note 185, at 1035 (exposing the shortcomings of pure consequentialist 
deterrence theory). But see Katyal, supra note 11, at 1372–75 (discussing how deterrence is a primary 
justification for Pinkerton liability); Harris, supra note 159, at 761 n.123 (explaining that the doctrine 
of transferred intent is one of the legal system’s “tools of result-oriented jurisprudence”). 
 187 See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S 640, 647–48 (1946); infra notes 188−194 and accom-
panying text (discussing the deterrence benefit of an unencumbered Cherry doctrine). 
 188 See JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 494 (1985) 
(explaining that the greatest deterrent effect of expansive liability for conspiracy members will be felt 
by individuals other than the particular defendant); Katyal, supra note 11, at 1372–75 (explaining how 
expansive conspiracy liability deters group criminality). 
 189 See Katyal, supra note 11, at 1374. Admittedly, deterrence theory assumes an awareness of the 
law that might not actually exists; nonetheless, deterrence theory posits that individuals will learn to 
avoid crimes that are punished most severely. See WILSON & HERRNSTEIN, supra note 188, at 494; 
Katyal, supra note 11, at 1374. 
 190 See Katyal, supra note 11, at 1315 (“Deterrence is a function of the severity of a criminal 
sanction discounted by the probability that it will actually be enforced.”). 
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es.191 If conspiracy members learn that witnesses’ statements to police will be 
used against them regardless of whether they are available for trial, the con-
spirators will no longer have the same incentive to intimidate or kill them.192 
If, however, forfeiture is denied unless the government is able to produce clear 
evidence of the defendant’s personal intent to procure the witness’s absence, 
then the law creates the “horribly perverse incentive, to ‘finish the job’ and 
make the assault a fatal one.”193 Such social motivation, when carefully cali-
brated, should be embraced to better combat the dangerous threat of witness 
intimidation in the context of group criminality.194 
Finally, the counter-arguments raised by skeptics—those who have pre-
dicted that Giles renders the Cherry doctrine dead letter—are ultimately unper-
suasive.195 One counter-argument is that the rights guaranteed by the Confron-
tation Clause are personal to the defendant, and thus only the defendant should 
be able to waive or forfeit those rights.196 This position submits that the Con-
frontation Clause requires the “intentional relinquishment” of these rights by 
the particular defendant for forfeiture to ever be justified.197 Further, this posi-
tion suggests that courts should be skeptical of forfeiture claims given the Su-
preme Court’s “presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights.”198 
Although superficially appealing, this analysis is fundamentally 
flawed.199 First, because the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing is premised 
                                                                                                                           
 191 See id. at 1374. 
 192 See Thompson, 286 F.3d at 962 (“The primary reasoning behind [the forfeiture] rule is obvi-
ous—to deter criminals from intimidating or ‘taking care of’ potential witnesses against them.”); 
Katyal, supra note 11, at 1315 (explaining marginal deterrence theory generally); Tom Lininger, 
Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 808 (2005) (arguing that “[t]he doctrine of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing would help to prevent abusers from manipulating witnesses” because with-
out the protection the doctrine provides, abusers would have greater incentive to resort to such vio-
lence). 
 193 Brief for Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 8 n.5, Giles v. 
California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008) (No. 07-6053), 2008 WL 859395, at *6 n.5; see George J. Stigler, The 
Optimum Enforcement of Laws, in ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 55, 57 
(Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes eds., 1974) (“If the thief has his hand cut off for taking five 
dollars, he had just as well take $5,000.”). 
 194 See WILSON & HERRNSTEIN, supra note 188, at 494; Katyal, supra note 11, at 1374–75. 
 195 See Rose, supra note 14, at 285 (arguing that Giles put an end to the Cherry doctrine); see also 
Lininger, supra note 17, at 908 (arguing that hearsay rules are not consistent with the newfound Giles 
design requirement). 
 196 See Rose, supra note 14, at 291–92. 
 197 Id. at 292 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), overruled in part on other 
grounds by Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)). 
 198 Id. at 306 (quoting Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966)). 
 199 See infra notes 200−204 and accompanying text. 
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on a forfeiture principle, the comparison to waiver is inapposite.200 Waiver re-
quires “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or priv-
ilege.”201 Forfeiture, on the other hand, generally carries no such intent re-
quirement.202 Further, even should the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine be 
analyzed through the waiver lens, the Cherry doctrine nonetheless survives 
because the “intention to relinquish a right” can be inferred from a defendant’s 
conduct.203 Accordingly, any attempt to read additional requirements for forfei-
ture into the Giles decision—beyond what the Court stated—should be reject-
ed.204 
Finally, to separate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a conspir-
acy from its design would be logically inconsistent.205 As these two concepts 
are necessarily intertwined, a conspiracy is designed to achieve all that is with-
in the scope of that conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable to its members.206 
When a defendant’s co-conspirator procures a witness’s unavailability, and 
                                                                                                                           
 200 See Taylor, 684 F.2d at 1201 n.8. In its 1982 decision in Steele v. Taylor, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit explained: 
 It should be noted that the “waiver” concept is not applicable, strictly speaking, to 
procurement, and its use is somewhat confusing. It is a legal fiction to say that a person 
who interferes with a witness thereby knowingly, intelligently and deliberately relin-
quishes his right to exclude hearsay. He simply does a wrongful act that has legal con-
sequences that he may or may not foresee. 
Id.; see also 2 MCCORMICK, TREATISE ON EVIDENCE app. A, at 665 (5th ed. 1999) (“‘Forfeiture’ 
should be substituted for ‘waiver’ because the concept of knowing waiver in this context is a fic-
tion.”); Moore, supra note 77, at 535 (noting that forfeiture reflects “the uniform position of jurisdic-
tions that have considered the question” and explaining that forfeiture “better reflects the legal princi-
ples that underpin the doctrine” (quoting Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 168 n.16 
(Mass. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). But see James F. Flanagan, Confrontation, Equity, 
and the Misnamed Exception for “Forfeiture” by Wrongdoing, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1193, 
1231 (2006) (arguing that a forfeiture-based theory produces unacceptable and excessive results be-
cause it does not tie the loss of constitutional rights to the intent of the individual actor). 
 201 Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464 (explaining that intent is required for waiver). 
 202 See Taylor, 684 F.2d at 1201 n.8 (explaining that intent is not required for forfeiture). 
 203 See Dinkins, 691 F.3d at 383, 385 (noting that “[t]he actual knowledge and intention to relin-
quish a right are inferred from the defendant’s actions and the context in which they are taken”). 
 204 See id. (stating that “[t]he Giles decision did not materially alter application of the forfeiture-
by-wrongdoing exception”). 
 205 See infra notes 139−204 and accompanying text. Importantly, this Note does not propose an 
argument for expansive conspiratorial liability; instead, it argues that in order to achieve logical con-
sistency, the limits of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine must be made contiguous with the ac-
cepted limits of conspiratorial liability. See Pinkerton, 328 U.S at 647–48; Cherry, 217 F.3d at 821. 
 206 See Cherry, 217 F.3d at 821 (“[T]he scope of the conspiracy is not necessarily limited to a 
primary goal—such as bank robbery—but can also include secondary goals relevant to the evasion of 
apprehension and prosecution for that goal—such as escape, or, by analogy, obstruction of justice.”). 
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such an action is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conspiracy, the 
co-conspirator’s intent must be imputable for purposes of forfeiture.207 
CONCLUSION 
To combat the ever-expanding problem of witness intimidation, courts 
have employed familiar concepts of conspiracy liability to justify the extension 
of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in the context of group criminality. 
Under the Cherry doctrine, whether a co-conspirator’s misconduct is imputed 
to defendants so as to render their confrontation rights forfeited is governed by 
the traditional limits of conspiracy liability under Pinkerton. To impute forfei-
ture to a defendant, the government must demonstrate that the wrongdoing 
was: (1) done in furtherance of the conspiracy; (2) within the scope of the un-
lawful project; and (3) reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or natural conse-
quence of the unlawful agreement. 
In Giles, the Supreme Court added a wrinkle to the forfeiture by wrong-
doing analysis that seemingly put the Cherry doctrine in jeopardy. By inserting 
a new element of intent, the Giles decision potentially limited forfeiture to sit-
uations where a defendant personally possessed the intent to make a witness 
unavailable. 
Despite what some commenters have suggested, however, the Cherry 
doctrine survives the Giles Court’s shift in emphasis. Even though Giles now 
requires the intent to make a witness unavailable, the scope of the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing doctrine remains unchanged in the co-conspirator context. Ac-
cordingly, so long as a co-conspirator possesses the intent to make a witness 
unavailable, this intent can be imputed to the defendant, thus allowing the 
Cherry doctrine to live on. 
This outcome is supported by the text of the Giles decision, comparisons 
to analogous doctrines, and the policies underlying the forfeiture doctrine. The 
text of the Giles decision acknowledges the importance of context, suggesting 
that a gang’s violent reputation may support forfeiture even without facts that 
specifically support an individual’s intent to make a witness unavailable. Addi-
tionally, various other legal constructs are routinely employed to impose crim-
inal liability even when a mens rea element is lacking. Finally, the continued 
vitality of the Cherry doctrine is consistent with the policy goals of deterring 
witness intimidation and group criminality. Accordingly, even post-Giles, the 
                                                                                                                           
 207 See Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647; Dinkins, 691 F.3d at 383; Cherry, 217 F.3d at 821; see also 
Moore, supra note 77, at 531 (advocating for a forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in Florida that 
would permit intent to be imputed to co-conspirators in a manner consistent with Cherry). 
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Cherry doctrine is still available even when another co-conspirator has made 
sure that a witness is not. 
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